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                                                    Abstract 
In this thesis, we will analyze the effect of IPOs on R&D investment and argue 
a change in the role of VC in the pre- and post-IPO periods for Japanese firms. It 
can be stated that the shareholding by VC mitigates the financial constraints of 
firms and is positively correlated with their R&D investment in the pre-IPO period; 
however,  this  effect  disappears  in  the  post-IPO  period.  In  addition,  it  can  be 
assumed that financial constraints are released and informational asymmetries are 
reduced by IPOs. Thus, R&D investment is influenced by IPOs.                                                                                              
                                                   
* I am deeply indebted to my doctoral dissertation advisers, Professors Hiroyuki Okamuro and Sadao 
Nagaoka, for their counsel and guidance.  
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1.  Introduction   
 
In recent years, there has been a boom in the number of initial public offerings 
(IPO) by venture firms in new stock markets, such as JASDAQ and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Mothers. In 2001, 169 firms issued IPOs—a number of them were issued 
in  the  new  stock  markets.  Many  of  these  169  firms  were  funded  by  venture 
capitalists (VC), which enabled them to issue the IPOs.   
An IPO that provides reliable information regarding the firm value will reduce 
informational asymmetry.  Firms  issuing IPOs  receive a  considerable infusion  of 
funds from the stock market; consequently, the financial constraints of the firms are 
mitigated in the post-IPO period (Rock, 1986; Benninga et al., 2005).       
        A VC investment is a signal for other investors and financial institutions. Thus, 
VC may improve the financial environment and promote the growth of the firms 
that it funds, thus increasing the success rate of the IPO (Barry et al., 1990; Davila 
et al., 2003).   
Previous studies have investigated the relationship between VC and innovation. 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) argue that VC-backed firms have an incentive to protect 
technology.    Sahlman (1990) proves that VC have not only the incentive but also  
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the power and ability to promote the innovative activities of portfolio firms by using 
their specialized experience and expertise. In addition, Hellmann and Puri (2000) 
support  this  view  and  show  that  VC  participate  in  the  innovative  strategy  of 
high-tech firms.   
Despite the increasing focus on the VC’s contribution to innovation, there are 
few previous studies that focused on the effect of IPOs on the R&D investment of 
Japanese firms and the relationship between the latter and VC in the pre- and 
post-IPO periods.   
In  this  thesis,  we  will  analyze  the  effect  of  IPOs  on  R&D  investment  and 
discuss the change in the role of VC in the pre- and post-IPO periods of Japanese 
firms. It is estimated that IPOs mitigate the financial constraints of the firms and 
reduce informational asymmetries. Further, firms issuing IPOs receive a significant 
infusion of cash from the sale of shares to investors. Thus, IPOs influence R&D 
investment. Moreover, VC are regarded as independent and professionally managed, 
dedicated pools of capital that focus on investments that have a higher risk but a 
greater  profit  potential  (Gompers,  2004).  Thus,  VC  mitigate  the  financial  cons- 
traints and promotes the R&D investment of firms.   
        The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the  
  4 
effects of VC and IPOs on R&D investment. Section 3 explains the estimation model. 
Section 4 presents the data; section 5, the empirical results and their implications. 
Finally, section 6 concludes the thesis, presenting certain limitations of this study 
and discussing the scope for further research.   
 
2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
Many  scholars  have  demonstrated  that  capital  investments,  in  general,  are 
very  sensitive  to  the  availability  of  internal  funds  in  the  way  that  R&D 
expenditures are significantly influenced by cash flow (Fazzari and Athey, 1987; 
Fazzari et al, 1988). Cash flow is the measure of the availability of internal funds. If 
capital  market  is  perfect  and  there  is  no  informational  asymmetry  between 
investors and recipients of capital, there are no differences of capital cost between 
internal and external funds. However, capital market is imperfect in reality, and the 
informational asymmetry raises the cost of external funding because of monitoring 
cost and risk premium. Thus, R&D investment, which is essentially accompanied by 
high risk, is constrained by the availability of internal funds (Hall, 2002). Therefore, 
it is suggested that firms with more cash flow will make more R&D investments.      
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IPOs have a considerable impact on the management activities of firms. Firms 
issuing IPOs are required to provide substantial internal information pertaining to 
firm value; further, these firms accumulate a large amount of funds through IPOs. 
It  can  be  estimated  that  reduced  financial  constraints  and  informational 
asymmetry brought about through IPOs will influence R&D investments. Further, 
VC play an important role in the financing of young firms that will issue IPOs. Thus, 
we  believe  that  shareholding  by  VC  can  be  associated  with  the  management 
activities of the  firms,  and  can  consequently, influence  the R&D  investments  of 
these firms.   
 
IPO and R&D Investment 
        Informational  asymmetries  are  likely  to  be  particularly  disadvantageous  to 
innovative  firms  due  to  the  unique  nature  of  R&D  activities.  With  regard  to 
informational  asymmetry,  Rock  (1986)  argues  that  since  an  IPO  would  provide 
reliable  information  on  firm  value,  it  would  reduce  informational  asymmetry. 
Yonezawa  and Miyazaki  (1996) observe that  the performance  of Japanese  firms 
improves as the ownership structure becomes concentrated in the post-IPO period. 
Firms issuing IPOs receive a considerable infusion of funds from the sale of new  
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shares to investors in the market. Thus, the IPO firms obtain sufficient external 
funds; as a result, they face less financial constraints in the post-IPO period than in 
the pre-IPO period (Benninga et al., 2005).       
After an  IPO, it becomes  easy  for a  firm to  obtain finance  from  the  capital 
market; this increase in the variety of finance sources may yield profits for a firm, 
which  previously  depended  on  loans  from  financial  institutions.  Firms  with  a 
promising investment project or a high growth rate can obtain large-size finance 
from the capital market by issuing stocks, besides relying on internal reserves and 
bank loans obtained as financial funds for an investment. It can be assumed that 
the  performance  of  firms  has  an  equilateral  correlation  with  IPOs  (Hoshi  and 
Kashyap,  2001;  Yonezawa,  1996).  In  other  words,  it  can  be  assumed  that  the 
performance of a firm improves in the post-IPO period.   
However, Jain and Kini (1994)  report a  significant decline in  the  operating 
performance of firms in the post-IPO period; beside, they argue that this can be 
partly explained by the decrease in the managers’ incentives. Moreover, Kutsuna et 
al. (2002) examined the relationship between the ownership structure in the pre- 
and post-IPO periods and the operating performance of JASDAQ firms. They argue 
that the positive influence of VC to the management activities of the firms has not  
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been documented in the pre- and post-IPO periods.   
In other words, we cannot assume that IPOs have a positive impact on the 
management activities of firms. Moreover, few studies have analyzed the effect of 
IPOs on the R&D investment of Japanese firms. Hence, it is necessary to carry out a 
study of this effect at a firm level. 
 
VC and R&D Investment 
There  have  been  a  few  studies  on  the  relationship  between  VC  and  IPOs. 
Stuart  et al.  (1999),  who performed  an analysis  of  the  rate  of IPO  and  market 
capitalization  at  IPO  of  a large sample  of venture  firms, proved that  the firms 
whose  essential  strategic partners  and  organizational  equity  investors  were  VC 
issued IPOs sooner and achieved higher valuation at IPO than did those without 
VC.   
Brav and Gompers (1997) suggest that VC generally form an important source 
of external finance for high-tech firms, thereby encouraging these firms to make the 
necessary R&D investments that would ensure high performance over the long- 
term.  Further,  they  believe  that  VC  backing  might  continue  to  mitigate  the 
financial constraints of these firms in the post-IPO period.  
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Moreover,  in  his  study  of  the  financing  of  firms  with  high  levels  of  risk, 
Gompers (2004) defines VC as independent and professionally managed dedicated 
pools of capital that focus on investments that have a higher risk but a greater 
profit potential.   
Several studies have also been conducted on the relationship between VC and 
the mitigating of financial constraints. For instance, Gompers and Lerner (2001) 
argue  that  VC  are  an  important  intermediary  for  firms  that  (1)  have  limited 
internal funds, (2) have little opportunity to receive external financing, and (3) are 
generally associated with high levels of risk, and are therefore characterized by 
informational asymmetry between managers and external investors. Thus, VC have 
the incentive to promote risky R&D investments.   
Moreover, VC have a unique financial method known as “staged capital infu- 
sions,” which is different from that of banks. Staged capital infusions implies that 
VC will not provide the firm with the necessary funds all at once; instead, at every 
stage of a firm’s development, VC will provide it with only that amount which is 
necessary to achieve the next step. Further, by providing firms with limited funding 
and reviewing the progress of a firm regularly, the VC can terminate the relation- 
ship at any time if it considers the future of the project or the firm to be unprofitable.  
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Staged capital infusions are regarded as the most potent control mechanism. The 
role  of  staged capital  infusion, in comparison with that  of debt,  is important in 
highly  leveraged  transactions  in  that  it  helps  to  maintain  a  close  relationship 
between  the  owners  and  managers  and  reduces  the  potential  disadvantage 
resulting from poor decisions. In addition, VC periodically gather information and 
maintain the option of discontinuing the funding of projects with little probability of 
going  public  (Gompers,  1995).  Thus,  this  potent  control  mechanism  reduces 
informational asymmetries, and influences the R&D investment of firms.   
    Only a few studies have been conducted on the relationship between VC and 
innovative output. Kortum and Lerner (2000) investigate the influence of VC on 
patented innovation by American firms. They argue that VC-backed firms are (1) 
motivated to apply for patents and (2) more likely to be the source of highly valuable 
and innovative ideas. Further, they observed that entrepreneurial, human-capital 
intensive ventures generate higher levels of patenting output than do established 
firms. Therefore, VC funding is positively associated with a substantial increase in 
patenting.   
Moreover,  it  can  be  assumed  that  VC-backed  firms  raise  significantly  more 
funds through IPOs than do non-VC-backed firms. This is because VC-backed firms  
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are  able  to  make  considerably  more  R&D  investments  prior  to  issuing  an IPO, 
chiefly because of the equity finance received from the VC. The fact that VC-backed 
firms are better suited to fund major investments prior to issuing an IPO is perhaps 
a significant advantage of venture financing; moreover, in the long-run, it is likely 
to drive the superior performance of VC-backed firms.   
On the other hand, Engel and Keilbach (2005), in their research on German 
firms, demonstrate that VC invest in firms with a higher innovative output and a 
highly qualified  management, thereby proving that  VC-backed  firms  are  in  fact 
more innovative than non-VC-backed firms.   
For this, Okamuro and Zhang (2006) argue that the shareholding by VC have, 
in fact, positive and significant effects on the R&D investment of start-up firms, 
even after controlling for the innovativeness prior to the VC investment. 
        Despite the increasing focus on IPOs and VC, only a few studies have focused 
on (1) the relationship between IPOs and R&D investment and (2) the change in the 
impact of VC on R&D investment in the pre- and post-IPO periods. In addition, we 
are unable to find a study that analyzes the relationship among IPOs, VC, and the 
R&D investment of Japanese firms. This thesis should fill this gap.   
Based on the above discussion, we propose the following three hypotheses.    
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Hypothesis 1: IPOs mitigate the financial constraints of firms and increase their 
R&D investments in the post-IPO period.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Shareholding by VC mitigates financial constraints of firms and is 
positively correlated with their R&D investments in the pre-IPO period. 
 
Hypothesis  3:  The  positive  influence  of  VC  on  the  R&D  investments  of  firms 
decrease in the post-IPO period with mitigated financial constraints. 
 
3.  Estimation Strategy   
 
In order to test these hypotheses, we estimate the following model.   
RD = f (Ownership Structure, Other Firm-level Factors, Industry Factors) 
The dependent variable (LOGRD) is the natural logarithm of the R&D intensity 
defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. We employ the natural logarithm 
of the R&D intensity to normalize the skewed distribution. As explained later, our 
sample comprises only firms with positive values of R&D investments.   
The  natural  logarithm  of  the  R&D  intensity  is  regressed  to  the  factors  of  
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ownership structure, other firm-level factors, and industry factors, using a firm- 
level cross-section  sample.  We  employ the  heteroskedasticity-consistent ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation for the empirical analysis.   
The explanatory variables are the ratio of total capital raised (public offering 
and offer for sale) to sales (SHSA); the ratios of shareholding by all VC (VCSH), the 
ratios of shareholding by lead VC (TOP_VC), all financial institutions (FINSH), and 
non-financial  business corporations (COMPSH);  dummies  for  the permanence  of 
lead VC shareholder (TOP_VCD) and for patent application (initial innovativeness) 
(PATENT);  cash  flow-to-sales  ratio  (CF);  intersections  of  CF  and  TOP_VC 
(CF*TOP_VC) as well as CF and SHSA (CF*SHSA); the ratio of total debt to total 
assets (DEBT); and the logarithm of the total assets (SIZE) and industry dummy 
variables. The definitions of these variables are summarized in Table-Ⅲ-1.   
The ratio of total capital raised to sales (SHSA) measures the influence of IPOs 
on R&D investment. Thus, it can be stated that the amount of funds obtained for 
R&D investment increases with the total capital raised.   
The variables of ownership structure are VCSH, TOP_VC, TOP_VCD, FINSH, 
and COMPSH. The VC relationship is represented by VCSH and TOP_VC, where 
VCSH is the ratio of the total shares held by all VC and TOP_VC is the ratio of  
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shares  held by  the lead  VC.  Here, we  regard  the VC  holding  the  largest  share 
among the VC as the lead VC. These variables are used interchangeably in the 
estimations.  Based  on  the  discussion  in  the  previous  section,  we  expect  that 
shareholding by VC will positively impact the R&D intensity in the pre-IPO period.   
The dummy for the permanence of lead VC (TOP_VCD) measures the influence 
of the permanence of lead VC on R&D investment. In this thesis, the permanence of 
lead VC is indicated by the fact that the lead VC remains unchanged in the pre- and 
post-IPO periods. This permanence shows that the lead VC can continue to impact 
R&D investment in the pre- and post-IPO periods. The dummy for this variable   
(TOP_VCD) takes the value one if the lead VC is the same in the pre- and post-IPO 
periods, and zero otherwise.   
Other  variables  of  ownership  structure  are  the  ratios  of  shareholding  by 
financial institutions (FINSH) and non-financial business corporations (COMPSH). 
In  this  model,  if  the  estimated  coefficients  of  these  variables  are  positive  and 
significant in the pre- and post-IPO periods, it is assumed that financial institutions 
and firms impact the R&D investment of firms in these periods.   
With regard to other firm-level factors, the variables CF, DEBT, and SIZE are 
used in the estimation model. Here, cash flow is calculated by [current profit +  
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depreciation – (director bonus + dividend)]. The cash-to-sales ratio (CF) is used as a 
proxy for the availability of internal funds.   
The intersection of CF and TOP_VC (CF*TOP_VC) shows the effect that VC 
has on the reduction of the limitations on cash flow. In comparison with VC-backed 
firms, non-VC-backed firms are more strongly influenced by their internal funds. If 
the coefficient of CF shows a positive and significant value and the coefficient of 
CF*TOP_VC  shows  a  negative  and  significant  value,  it  is  supposed  that  the 
existence of VC mitigates constraints of internal funds.   
The intersection of CF and SHSA (CF*SHSA) shows the effect of share sales on 
the reduction of the limitations on cash flow. If the coefficient of CF shows a positive 
and  significant  value  and  the  coefficient  of  CF*SHSA  shows  a  negative  and 
significant value, it is inferred that share sales mitigate financial constraints.   
The ratio of total debt to total assets (DEBT) is a variable that indicates the 
effect of corporate debt on R&D investment. When a firm is under enormous debt, 
debt overhang problems arise1. Such problems curtail R&D investment.     
        The natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) is a proxy variable for firm size. 
According to the Schumpeterian Hypothesis, large firms will make over-proportion- 
                                                   
1: The study suggesting that a debt decreases R&D investment was conducted by Myers (1977).  
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ally more R&D investments. This is because large firms have ample internal funds, 
many opportunities to obtain external funds, and the ability to take higher risk. 
Therefore, we need to control the firm size effect.   
        Industry  factors  are  represented  by  industry  dummy  variables.  The  R&D 
intensity  varies  considerably  across  industries,  reflecting  the  differences  in  the 
technological opportunities and appropriability of innovative outcomes. It is widely 
acknowledged that R&D intensity is particularly high in manufacturing industries, 
and this belief is supported by our data. Therefore, we include dummy variables for 
these  industries—manufacturing  (MAND),  wholesale  and  retail  (WRD),  and 
communication (COMD)—in the estimation model.   
In such a case, the use of instrumental variables is often a standard estimation 
strategy. However, owing to the constraints of the data, we are unable to identify an 
appropriate instrument; instead, we decided to control for the innovativeness of the 
firms prior to the VC investment, using past patent application data. Accordingly, 
we are at least able to argue that VC-backed firms are more R&D- intensive than 
the others, even after controlling for the innovativeness of the firms in the past. 
Therefore, we use the dummy variable PATENT that takes the value one if the firm 
has made at least one patent application between the year of incorporation and  
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1997 (pre-IPO) or 1999 (post-IPO), and zero otherwise2.   
If the coefficient of SHSA has a positive and significant value, the coefficient of 
CF shows a positive and significant value, and the coefficient of CF* SHSA shows a 
negative and significant value in the post-IPO period, hypothesis 1 is supported. If 
the coefficients  of VCSH  and TOP_VC have positive  and  significant  values,  the 
coefficient of CF shows a positive and significant value, and the coefficient of CF* 
TOP_VC shows a negative and significant value in the pre-IPO period, hypothesis 2 
is supported.   
If the coefficients of VCSH, TOP_VC and CF*TOP_VC are smaller in the post- 
IPO period than in the pre-IPO period, and this are not significant, hypothesis 3 is 
supported.       
 
4.  Description of Data   
 
                                                   
2: One of the problems regarding this variable is the extent to which the “past” should be considered; in other words, 
what should be the time lag between patent application data and other data, particularly ownership data. We 
need to determine the year in which the innovativeness in the past is measured without knowing when the first 
VC investment was made. Therefore, the time lag should be sufficiently long, considering the possibility that VC 
funding began long before it was actually measured in the fiscal year 2000 or 2002. If the time lag is very short, 
the causality problem will not be solved because the first VC investment may have occurred after innovativeness 
was measured. However, if we consider a long time lag, the sample size will be very small or we will be unable to 
obtain the patent data. In this thesis, we have considered a time lag of 3 years.  
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We use financial and shareholder data for the year 2000 and 2002. Financial 
data (excluding cash flow) and shareholder data for the pre-IPO period are collected 
from the “EOL DB Tower Service Database”; data regarding cash flow for pre-IPO 
period are collected from the “Nikkei Financial Analysis (Nikkei Keiei Bunseki)”   
(Unlisted  Firms).  Financial  data  for  the  post-IPO  period  are  obtained  from  the 
annual issue of “Nikkei Needs Annual Corporate Financial Data” of Nikkei Quick 
Information; shareholder data are collected from the annual reports of the firms. 
The  information  pertaining  to  VC  is  obtained  from  the  “Japanese  Venture 
Capitalists Compendium”. Total capital raised (public offering and offer for sale) are 
obtained from the “White Papers of Initial Public Offerings, 2002”.   
The analysis performed in this thesis targeted 169 firms that issued an IPO in 
the year 2001. We obtained data from 76 firms in the pre- and post-IPO periods— 
2000 and 2002, respectively. Our dataset includes data on R&D expenditures, sales, 
cash  flow,  debt,  and  total assets  and  data  on  shareholding  by all  VC,  financial 
institutions, and non-financial business corporations.   
        Among the 76 firms, the number of VC-backed firms was 60 and that of the 
non-VC-backed  firms  was  16 in  the pre-IPO period.  In  the post-IPO period,  the 
number of VC-backed firms was 39 and that of non-VC-backed firms was 37. Given  
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the above, it can be stated that the majority of sample firms is financed by VC in the 
pre- and post-IPO periods was high.         
        In the pre-IPO period, the mean value of the R&D intensity of the firms is 
0.0254, but the median is only 0.011. In the post-IPO period, the mean is 0.0291, 
and the median is only 0.00983. The descriptive statistics presented in Table-Ⅲ-2 
suggest that the distribution of the dependent variable is skewed to the left in the 
pre- and post-IPO periods. Therefore, we employ the natural logarithm of the R&D 
intensity in the empirical analysis.   
        The  comparisons  of  the  mean  values  of  R&D  intensity  (RD)  and  CF  are 
presented in Table-Ⅲ-3. It is shown that the mean values of RD in the pre- and 
post-IPO periods are not significantly different; while, the mean value of CF in the 
post-IPO period is significantly higher than that in the pre-IPO period (Table-Ⅲ
-3-1).   
        In addition, it can be established that in the pre-IPO period, the mean values of 
RD  and  CF  of  VC-backed  firms  are  significantly  higher  than  those  of  non-VC- 
backed firms (Table-Ⅲ-3-2). This suggests that the RD of the VC-backed firms was 
higher than that of the non-VC-backed firms and that cash flow may have had a 
greater effect on the R&D investment of the VC-backed firms than it did on that of  
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the non-VC-backed firms, in the pre-IPO period.   
In the post-IPO period, there are not significant differences between the mean 
values  (Table-3-3).  This  indicates  that  the  effect  of  VC  on  R&D  investment 
becomes feeble after IPO. Correlation matrix is presented in Table-Ⅲ-4. 
 
5.  Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
We  estimate  the  relationship  between  VC  investment,  IPO,  and  R&D 
investment using the model presented in section 3. In addition, we employed the 
heteroskedasticity-consistent  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimation.  The 
variables of shareholding by VC (VCSH and TOP-VC) are included interchangeably 
in the estimation. The estimations of the pre- and post-IPO periods are compared. 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table-Ⅲ-5. All the models include 
industry dummies, which are not shown in the table.   
The coefficients of SHSA (total capital raised/sales) have positive and significant 
values in the post-IPO period. Further, the coefficients of CF show a positive and 
significant values, and the coefficient of CF*SHSA shows a negative and significant 
value; thus, it can be stated that the capital raised through IPOs mitigates the  
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constraints on cash flow. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported.     
With regard to the variables of ownership structure, in the pre-IPO period, the 
coefficients of both VCSH and TOP_VC show significantly positive values; further, 
the coefficients of CF show positive and significant values and the coefficient of the 
intersection of CF and TOP_VC (CF*TOP_VC) show negative and significant value. 
Thus, it  can  be  stated  that  shareholding  by  VC  mitigates  financial  constraints; 
moreover, it is positively correlated with the R&D intensity in the pre-IPO period. 
Thus, hypothesis 2 is supported. 
However,  the  coefficients  of  VCSH,  TOP_VC  and  CF*TOP_VC  do  not  show 
significant values in the post-IPO period. This indicates that the effect of VC share- 
holding on R&D investment decreases in the post-IPO period. Therefore, hypothesis 
3 is supported. Further, the coefficients of TOP_VCD do not show significant values 
in the post-IPO period, implying that the change of lead VC after IPO has no effect 
on RD.   
  In  contrast, in  the pre- and post-IPO  periods, the  coefficients of  FINSH and 
COMSH do not show significant values. This suggests that the effect of sharehold- 
ing  by  financial  institutions  and  non-financial  business  corporations  on  R&D 
investment is not significant.    
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With regard to other firm-level factors, the coefficients of PATENT do not show 
significant values in the pre-IPO period; however, they show significant values in 
the post-IPO period (except model 3). In contrast, the coefficients of both VCSH and 
TOP_VC show significantly positive values in the pre-IPO period but not in the 
post-IPO period.   
Further, the coefficients of DEBT show negative and significant values in the 
model 1, 2 and 3 of post-IPO period. Other, the coefficients of DEBT do not show 
negative and significant values in the model 1, 2 and 3 of pre-IPO period and the 
model 4, 5, 6 and 7 of post-IPO period. And, the coefficients of SIZE do not show 
significant values in the pre- and post-IPO periods.   
Therefore, it can be stated that the shareholding by VC mitigates the financial 
constraints of firms and is positively correlated with their R&D investment in the 
pre-IPO period; however, this effect disappears in the post-IPO period. Further, it is 
proved that IPOs mitigates the financial constraints of firms and increases their 
R&D investment.   
 
6.  Conclusion   
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This thesis focused on the role of IPOs and VC in R&D investment and analy- 
zed  the  relationship  between the  characteristics  of the  ownership structure and 
R&D investment. It was observed that the IPOs of firms were positively correlated 
with R&D investment and that VC were positively correlated with R&D investment 
in the pre-IPO period. In addition, it was observed that cash flow was positively 
correlated  with  R&D  investment.  This  indicates  that  the  existence  of  an  IPO 
mitigates the limitations on cash flow for R&D investment.   
Based on the analysis, it was found that VC played a positive role in the R&D 
investment of Japanese firms in the pre-IPO period. Further, the R&D intensity of 
firms was higher in the post-IPO period than in the pre-IPO period.   
Therefore, when analyzing the relationship between R&D investment and the 
IPOs of Japanese firms, it becomes necessary to analyze the role of VC. Moreover, 
the investigation of the IPO strategy is important for an understanding of the R&D 
investment of firms.   
In  this  thesis,  we  have  generalized  the  aforementioned  conclusion  and  its 
significance; however, there are still a few limitations to this analysis. First, the 
sample size is small—the sample used for analysis comprised only 76 firms that had 
issued an IPO in 2001—and the problem of deflection arose. Since the data for R&D  
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expenditure was not available for all firms that issued an IPO, only those firms that 
published this data were chosen for the analysis. Second, we estimated only the 
direct  relationship  between  the  variables  of  ownership  structure  and  R&D 
investment.  We  did  not  investigate  how  shareholding  by  VC  affected  R&D 
investment.  Moreover,  the  variables  of  ownership  structure  were  regarded  as 
exogenous variables, but they may be endogenous.   
Nevertheless, there have been only a few empirical studies concerning the effect 
of IPOs on the R&D investment of Japanese firms. Thus, by studying the effect of 
IPOs  on and  the role  of  VC in the  R&D investment  of firms, our thesis  can be 
regarded as the first step toward conducting a productive research in this field.   
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          Structure Variables
   Table-Ⅲ‐ 1
Dependent
Variables Definitions
LOGRD Log(R&D Expenditures/Sales )
Explanatory 
Variables  Definitions
SHSA Total Capital Raised/Sales
VCSH Shareholding Ratio by all Venture Capital 
Ownership Structure/
    Governance FactorsTOP_VC Shareholding Ratio by Top-VC Shareholder 
TOP_VCD Dummy for Permanence of Top-VC Shareholder 
FINSH Shareholding Ratio by Financial Institution 
COMPSH Shareholding Ratio by Non-financial Business Corporations
CF Cash Flow/Sales 
CF*TOP_VC Intersection of CF and TOP_VC
CF*SHSA Intersection of CF and SHSA 
Firm-Level Factors/ PATENT Dummy for Patent Application
Industry Factors
DEBT Debt/Total Assets 
SIZE Log(Total Assets) 
MAND Manufacture Industry Dummy 
WRD Wholesale-Retail Industry Dummy
COMD Communication Industry Dummy 
  




　　　　　 Nｕｍｂｅｒ  of observations (76)
Variables  Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Median
LOGRD -4.51 1.47 -7.65 -1.99 -4.51
VCSH 0.0799 0.103 0 0.592 0.0457
TOP_VC 0.0319 0.0394 0 0.172 0.0183
FINSH 0.0539 0.0681 0 0.382 0.0325
COMPSH 0.334 0.315 0 0.969 0.213
CF 0.087 0.112 0 0.697 0.0575
CF*TOP_VC 0.00333 0.00885 0 0.0665 0.00066
PATENT 0.526 0.503 0 1 1
DEBT 0.559 0.224 0.0706 0.934 0.571
SIZE 8.51 1.22 6.16 12.5 8.54
MAND 0.474 0.503 0 1 0
WRD 0.0658 0.271 0 1 0
COMD 0.382 0.489 0 1 0
Post-IPO 2002年
　　　　　 Nｕｍｂｅｒ  of observations (76)
Variables  Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Median
LOGRD -4.58 1.55 -8.21 -0.966 -4.62
SHSA 0.304 0.361 0.00438 1.91 0.174
VCSH 0.0345 0.0911 0 0.711 0.0059
TOP_VC 0.0238 0.0789 0 0.671 0.00425
TOP_VCD 0.382 0.489 0 1 0
FINSH 0.105 0.107 0.0001 0.791 0.0753
COMPSH 0.288 0.237 0.007 0.861 0.197
CF 0.135 0.208 0 0.804 0.0486
CF*TOP_VC 0.00341 0.00754 0 0.0326 0
CF*SHSA 0.0711 0.167 0 1.05 0.00539
PATENT 0.579 0.497 0 1 1
DEBT 0.474 0.216 0.0759 0.883 0.471
SIZE 8.79 1.1 6.49 12.5 8.72
MAND 0.474 0.503 0 1 0
WRD 0.0658 0.271 0 1 0
COMD 0.382 0.489 0 1 0  
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                                                     Variation in IPO
  Table-Ⅲ‐ 3-1
Variables  Pre-IPO Post-IPO T-Value
R&D Expenditures/Sales (RD) 0.0254 0.0292 (0.541)
Cash Flow/Sales (CF) 0.087 0.135 (1.73)c
  Table-Ⅲ‐ 3-2 Pre-IPO
Variables  NON-VC VC T-Value
R&D Expenditures/Sales (RD)  0.0175 0.0275 (2.16)b
Cash Flow/Sales (CF) 0.0593 0.106 (2.10)b
  Table-Ⅲ‐ 3-3 Post-IPO
Variables  NON-VC VC T-Value
R&D Expenditures/Sales (RD) 0.0275 0.0308 (0.397)
Cash Flow/Sales (CF) 0.0735 0.193 (1.52)
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Correlation  Matrix
Table-Ⅲ‐ 4-1 Pre-IPO Number of Observations (76)
Variables  LOGRD VCSH TOP_VC FINSH COMPSH CF CF*TOP_VCPATENT DEBT SIZE
LOGRD 1
VCSH 0.302 1
TOP_VC 0.318 0.764 1
FINSH -0.275 -0.12 -0.0393 1
COMPSH -0.259 -0.407 -0.306 -0.179 1
CF 0.214 0.178 0.128 -0.154 0.0114 1
CF*TOP_VC 0.187 0.43 0.584 -0.0865 -0.105 0.638 1
PATENT 0.175 -0.111 -0.17 0.0402 -0.0272 -0.0941 -0.159 1
DEBT -0.285 -0.195 -0.343 0.229 0.175 -0.371 -0.236 0.175 1
SIZE -0.353 -0.36 -0.201 0.307 0.276 -0.237 -0.157 0.077 0.286 1
Table-Ⅲ‐ 4-2 Post-IPO Number of Observations (76)
Variables  LOGRD SHSA VCSH TOP_VC TOP_VCD FINSH COMPSH CF CF*TOP_VCCF*SHSAPATENT DEBT SIZE
LOGRD 1
SHSA 0.222 1
VCSH 0.0753 -0.118 1
TOP_VC 0.0349 -0.0811 0.961 1
TOP_VCD 0.0981 0.143 0.212 0.106 1
FINSH -0.106 -0.0601 0.00247 0.0394 -0.0624 1
COMPSH -0.153 0.0613 -0.225 -0.169 -0.269 0.142 1
CF 0.377 0.408 0.0581 0.0126 0.289 -0.108 -0.188 1
CF*TOP_VC 0.186 0.308 0.659 0.59 0.179 -0.0513 -0.262 0.611 1
CF*SHSA 0.222 0.904 -0.0441 -0.0239 0.115 -0.0715 -0.0264 0.213 0.0121 1
PATENT 0.102 -0.0169 -0.219 -0.177 -0.153 0.083 0.131 -0.305 -0.268 -0.149 1
DEBT -0.388 0.0741 -0.177 -0.129 -0.174 0.233 0.153 -0.348 -0.196 -0.0837 0.153 1
SIZE -0.267 0.0524 -0.0392 0.0195 -0.0198 0.128 0.13 -0.281 -0.0805 -0.0571 0.138 0.312 1   
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   Table-Ⅲ-5: Estimation Results
   （OLS：Heterosｋedasticity-consistent t statistics in parentheses）
Log(R&D Expenditures/Sales )
Pre-IPO Post-IPO
Explanatory Variables  ① ② ③ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
SHSA 1.09 1.11 1.15 1.71
(3.26)a (3.27)a (2.74)a (4.16)a
VCSH 2.24 0.953 0.929 0.839
(1.84)c (0.567) (0.647) (0.643)
TOP_VC 8.05 13.04 0.830 2.17 1.00 2.74
(2.32)b (3.33)a (0.327) (0.504) (0.383) (0.663)
TOP_VCD -0.102 -0.0849 0.00152 -0.157
(-0.353) (-0.284) (0.00499) (-0.567)
FINSH -5.49 -5.77-5.66 -0.344 -0.355 -0.375-0.33 -0.344 -0.355 -0.386
(-2.56)b (-2.61)b (-2.65)a (-0.199) (-0.205) (-0.215) (-0.218) (-0.226) (-0.229) (-0.245)
COMPSH -0.514-0.501-0.501 -0.214 -0.254 -0.332 -0.315 -0.327 -0.372 -0.242
(-1.05) (-1.08) (-1.02) (-0.368) (-0.438) (-0.565) (-0.489) (-0.509) (-0.563) (-0.377)
CF 2.06 2.16 3.96 2.12 2.12 2.66 1.70 1.69 2.332.69
(1.93)b (2.02)b (1.89)c (2.92)a (2.90)a (2.25)b (2.35)b (2.32)b (2.02)b (3.09)a




PATENT 0.409 0.443 0.467 0.5230.5160.494 0.5970.5940.5700.522
(1.43) (1.57) (1.64)(1.71)c (1.68)c (1.63) (2.03)b (2.02)b (1.92)c (1.71)c
DEBT -0.859 -0.527 -0.321 -1.92-1.93-1.92 -0.994 -0.986 -0.917 -0.967
(-1.16) (-0.735) (-0.501) (-2.77)a (-2.77)a (-2.77)a (-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.19) (-1.28)
SIZE -0.125-0.165-0.167 -0.147 -0.146 -0.138-0.139 -0.142 -0.139 -0.116
(-1.04) (-1.44) (-1.56)(-1.27) (-1.24) (-1.22) (-1.43) (-1.46) (-1.44) (-1.25)
Constant -3.23 -3.12-2.93 -3.44 -3.42-3.19 -4.02 -3.99 -4.06 -4.37
(-3.19)a (-3.35)a (-3.07)a (-3.48)a (-3.45)a (-3.11)a (-4.49)a (-4.49)a (-4.50)a (-5.24)a
Adjusted R-squared  0.3520.373 0.384 0.338 0.336 0.3180.3640.3640.362 0.368
F-Value 5.08 5.46 5.68 4.82 4.8 4.49 4.58 4.58 4.27 4.36
Number of observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
1: The level of significance: a 1%, b 5%, c 10%.
   　　　　　　　  　　2: Industry dummies are included in the estimation, but not shown in the table.
 